The stochastic game Γ under consideration is repetition of the same stage game G which is played on each stage with different coalitional partitions. The probability distribution over the coalitional structures of each stage game depends on the initial stage game G and the n-tuple of strategies realized in this game. The payoffs in stage games (which is a simultaneous game with a given coalitional structure) are computed as components of the generalized PMS-vector [1], [2] . The total payoff of each player in game Γ is equal to the mathematical expectation of payoffs in different stage games G (mathematical expectation of the components of PMS-vector). The concept of solution for such class of stochastic game is proposed and the existence of this solution is proved.
Introduction
This paper belongs to the well investigated direction in management theorygame theory which deals with existence and finding optimal solution problems of management in a collision of parties, when each party tries to influence development of the conflict in accordance with its own interest. Problems that arise in different practical spheres are solved according to the game theory models. In particular, these are the problems of management, economics, decision theory.
In the paper a class of multistage stochastic games with different coalitional partitions is examined. A new mathematical method for solving stochastic coalitional games, based on calculation of the generalized PMS-value introduced in [1] , [2] for the first time, is proposed along with the proof of the solution existence. The probability distribution over the coalitional structures of each stage game depends on the initial stage coalitional game and the ntuple of strategies realized in this game. The theory is illustrated by 3-person 3-stage stochastic game with changing coalitional structure.
Remind that coalitional game is a game where players are united in fixed coalitions in order to obtain the maximum possible payoff, and stochastic game is a multistage game with random transitions from state to state, which is played by one or more players.
Statement of the problem
Suppose finite graph tree Γ = (Z, L) where Z is the set of vertices in the graph and L is point-to-set mapping, defined on the set Z: L (z) ⊂ Z, z ∈ Z. Finite graph tree with the initial vertex z 0 will be denoted by Γ (z 0 ).
In each vertex z ∈ Z of the graph Γ (z 0 ) simultaneous N -person game is defined in a normal form
where − N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players identical for all vertices z ∈ Z;
, m j is the set of pure strategies of player j ∈ N identical for all vertices z ∈ Z; − m j is the number of pure strategies of player j ∈ N in the set X j ; − x z j is the pure strategy of player j ∈ N at the vertex z ∈ Z; − µ z j = µ j k k=1,m j ∈ Σ j is the mixed strategy of player j ∈ N at the vertex z ∈ Z where µ j k is a choice probability for the j-th player to pick k-th pure strategy:
Σ j is the set of n-tuple in the mixed strategies identical for all
is the payoff function of the player j, identical for all vertices z ∈ Z ; it is proposed that K j (x z ) ≥ 0 ∀ x z ∈ X and ∀ j ∈ N. Furthermore, let in each vertex z ∈ Z of the graph Γ (z 0 ) the coalitional partition of the set N be defined
i. e. the set of players N is divided into l coalitions each acting as one player. Coalitional partitions can be different for different vertices z, i. e. l = l (z) .
Then in each vertex z ∈ Z we have the simultaneous l-person coalitional game in a normal form associating with game G (z)
where
X j is the set of strategiesx
of coalition S i is n-tuple strategies of players from coalition
is the set of n-tuples in the simultaneous game G (z , Σ z ); −μ z i is the mixed strategy of coalition S i , i = 1, l, at the vertex z ∈ Z; −Σ z i is the set of all mixed strategies of coalition S i , i = 1, l, at the vertex
, is the n-tuple of mixed strategies in the game G (z) in the mixed strategies at the vertex z ∈ Z;
is the set of n-tuple in the mixed strategies at the vertex z ∈ Z;
− the payoff of coalition S i is defined as a sum of payoffs of players from
. . , n} is the set of players identical for all vertices z ∈ Z; − Γ (z 0 ) is the graph tree with initial vertex z 0 ; − {G (z, Σ z )} z∈Z is the simultaneous coalitional l-person game defined in a normal form in each vertex z ∈ Z of the graph Γ (z 0 ) ; − {p (z, y; x z )} z∈Z , y∈L(z) , x z ∈X Z is the realization probability of the coalitional game G (y , Σ y ) at the vertex y ∈ L (z) under condition that n-tuple x z was realized at the previous step in the simultaneous game G (z , Σ z );
− kΓ is the finite and fixed number of steps in the stochastic gameΓ (z 0 ); the k-th step in the vertex z k ∈ Z is defined according to the condition of z k ∈ (L (z 0 )) k , i. e. the vertex z k is reached from the vertex z 0 in k steps.
States in the multistage stochastic gameΓ are the vertices of graph tree z ∈ Z with the defined coalitional partitions Σ z in each vertex, i. e. pair (z , Σ z ). GameΓ is stochastic, because transition from state (z , Σ z ) to the state (y , Σ y ), y ∈ L (z), is defined by the given probability p (z, y ; x z ). GameΓ (z 0 ) is realized as follows. GameΓ (z 0 ) starts at the vertex z 0 , where the game G (z 0 , Σ z 0 ) with a certain coalitional partition Σ z 0 is realized. Players choose their strategies, thus n-tuple of game x z 0 is formed. Then with given probabilities p (z 0 , z 1 ; x z 0 ) depending on n-tuple x z 0 the transition from vertex z 0 on the graph tree Γ (z 0 ) to the game G (z 1 , Σ z 1 ) , z 1 ∈ L (z 0 ) , is realized. In the game G (z 1 , Σ z 1 ) players choose their strategies again, ntuple of game x z 1 is formed. Then from vertex z 1 ∈ L (z 0 ) the transition to the vertex z 2 ∈ (L (z 0 )) 2 is made, again n-tuple game x z 2 is formed. This process continues until vertex z kΓ ∈ (L (z 0 )) kΓ , L z kΓ = ∅ is reached.
Denote byΓ (z) the subgame of gameΓ (z 0 ), starting at the vertex z ∈ Z of the graph Γ (z 0 ), i. e. at coalitional game G (z , Σ z ). Obviously the subgamẽ Γ (z) is also a stochastic game.
Step k. Define the operator PMS⊕ as PMS-vector, which for each player j = 1, n in any coalitional game G (z, Σ z ) of subgameΓ (z) , y ∈ [L (z)] k−1 , L (y) = ∅ , correspondingly PMS-components in the NEū z (·) :
where PMS j (z ) := PMS j (ū z (·)), PMS j (z ) := PMS j ū z (·) etc.
Conclusion
In this paper the new algorithm of solving of finite step coalitional stochastic game is proposed. A mathematical method for solving stochastic coalitional games is based on calculation of the generalized PMS-value.
